An Automated Dynamic Offset for Network Selection in Heterogeneous Networks by Haddad, Majed et al.
HAL Id: hal-01211210
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01211210
Submitted on 4 Oct 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
An Automated Dynamic Offset for Network Selection in
Heterogeneous Networks
Majed Haddad, Piotr Wiecek, Habib Sidi, Eitan Altman
To cite this version:
Majed Haddad, Piotr Wiecek, Habib Sidi, Eitan Altman. An Automated Dynamic Offset for Network
Selection in Heterogeneous Networks. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers, 2015, ￿10.1109/TMC.2015.2492560￿. ￿hal-01211210￿
1
An Automated Dynamic Offset for Network
Selection in Heterogeneous Networks
Majed Haddad, member, IEEE, Piotr Więcek, member, IEEE, Habib Sidi member, IEEE
and Eitan Altman, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Complementing traditional cellular networks
with the option of integrated small cells and WiFi access points
can be used to further boost the overall traffic capacity and
service level. Small cells along with WiFi access points are
projected to carry over 60% of all the global data traffic
by 2015. With the integration of small cells on the radio
access network levels, there is a focus on providing operators
with more control over small cell selection while reducing
the feedback burden. Altogether, these issues motivate the
need for innovative distributed and autonomous association
policies that operate on each user under the network operator’s
control, utilizing only partial information, yet achieving near-
optimal solutions for the network. In this paper, we propose
a load-aware network selection approach applied to auto-
mated dynamic offset in heterogeneous networks (HetNets).
In particular, we investigate the properties of a hierarchical
(Stackelberg) Bayesian game framework, in which the macro
cell dynamically chooses the offset about the state of the
channel in order to guide users to perform intelligent network
selection decisions between macro cell and small cell networks.
We derive analytically the utility related to the channel quality
perceived by users to obtain the equilibria, and compare it to
the fully centralized (optimal), the full channel state informa-
tion and the non-cooperative (autonomous) models. Building
upon these results, we effectively address the problem of how
to intelligently configure a dynamic offset which optimizes
network’s global utility while users maximize their individual
utilities. One of the technical contributions of the paper lies in
obtaining explicit characterizations of the dynamic offset at the
equilibrium and the related performances in terms of the price
of anarchy. Interestingly, it turns out that the complexity of
the algorithm for finding the dynamic offset of the Stackelberg
model is O(n4) (where n is the number of users). It is shown
that the proposed hierarchical mechanism keeps the price of
anarchy almost equal to 1 even for a low number of users,
and remains bounded above by the non-cooperative model.
Index Terms—Heterogeneous network, macro cell, small
cell, WiFi, network selection, dynamic offset, traffic steering,
channel distribution information, channel state information,
game theory, price of anarchy.
I. INTRODUCTION
To cope with the rapidly increasing demand for mobile
data driven largely by mobile video and personal communi-
cations, low power base stations (BSs) are being deployed
in dense urban areas to complement the existing cellular
architecture [1], [2]. Such a HetNet consists of macro
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cells (MCs) coexisting with low power nodes composed
of small cells (SCs), as well as using WiFi access points
(APs) in unlicensed spectrum [3]. This will allow for
better overall radio resource management, provide improved
overall mobile-broadband performance, and allow operators
to maintain a more seamless user experience [4]. Indeed,
densification of the network with SCs is a way to get more
capacity from existing spectrum. This results in shifting
the spectrum equation as the comparison between spectrum
costs and SC costs has changed dramatically. Both engineers
and academics are still working out ways for SCs and
WiFi APs to integrate seamlessly with macro BSs and with
one another. Network access selection is a major concern.
Clearly, the selection based on highest signal strength is
inadequate to address this challenge. Though traditionally
considered unsuitable for cellular networks, one approach
is to distribute the network selection decisions over the
users, as the device is the only entity aware of actual
connectivity conditions (e.g., radio conditions, throughput
over existing connectivity, etc.), and real-time conditions in
the device (e.g., type of pending traffic, status of device
including battery levels, etc.). Alternately, some regulators
have proposed delegating users more involvement on the
selection decision, but with retaining to the traditional
network-centric selection approach. Putting aside the tech-
nological challenges that such approaches bring in many
practical scenarios, it is very important that the impacts and
the performances of any proposed policy are theoretically
investigated.
A. Controlled Network Access Selection
SC access selection (or association) currently depends
very much on the device implementation. This means that
in typical implementations, the device selects the SC when
it is available. Different devices may also have different im-
plementations, leading to different user experiences. From
the operator’s point of view, it would be good to have
more control on the access selection to be able to provide
a more uniform experience. In fact, with the integration
of SCs on the radio access network (RAN) levels there
is a focus on providing operators with more control over
SC access selection. This control may be gained through
network-centric mobility mechanisms (e.g., direct handover
command or redirection to the SC), or by device-centric
mechanisms (e.g., more careful specification of the access-










When the MC load is 
higher than 80%, users with bad 
radio conditions are candidates 
to be steered to SC
Fig. 1. Exemplary traffic steering to small cell in a heterogeneous network: Both real-time network load and radio conditions are important factors in
making optimal network selection decisions.
schemes actually implemented by network operators are
fully centralized: the operator tries to maximize his utility
(revenue) by assigning the mobile users to different systems
(for a survey refer to [5]). However, distributed joint radio
resource management (JRRM) mechanisms are gaining in
importance: mobile users may be allowed to make au-
tonomous decisions in a distributed way. In the same trend,
[6] proposed a distributed algorithm which jointly determine
the amount of radio resources that MCs should offer to
SCs, and the association rules that decide which mobile
users should associate with SCs. In [7], a network interface
selection algorithm which maps user traffic across WiFi and
LTE is implemented to optimize user QoE through adaptive
traffic offloading. Evaluations on a real LTE-WiFi testbed
using YouTube traffic reveals that video stalls are reduced
by 3 4 times compared to naive solutions. In [8], a network
selection strategy considering small cell backhaul capacity
is proposed and evaluated in terms of connection throughput
and fairness. This has lead to game theoretic approaches to
the network selection problems in HetNets, as can be found
in [9]–[11]. [12] formulates the problem of user association
in the downlink of small cell networks as a many-to-one
matching game, in which base stations are assumed to be
aware of each user’s overall preferences.
Instead of taking part within the debate among the
supporters of each (centralized or distributed) solution, we
propose in this paper a Stackelberg formulation of the
network selection problem, where the operator optimizes
its global utility by sending appropriate information, while
mobile users compete to maximize their throughput by
picking the best locally serving RAN. By Stackelberg we
mean distributed decision making assisted by the network,
where the wireless users aim at maximizing their own
utility, guided by aggregated information broadcasted by the
network about the channel distribution information (CDI)
of each user. We derive the policy that corresponds to
the Stackelberg equilibrium and compare it to the fully
centralized (optimal), the full channel state information
(CSI) and the non-cooperative (autonomous) models.
B. Partial Information
In order to provide optimal use of RAN resources and
best end user experience, 3GPP is also working on the
integration of SC to include radio access technology (RAT)
selection, addressed through per user and real time based de-
cisions (e.g., network load and users’ radio conditions). For
example, in Fig. 1, when the cellular network is somewhat
congested, the operator who controls both the MC and the
SC networks may want to steer mobile users that experience
bad radio conditions on the cellular network (e.g., poor
Received Signal Reference Power (RSRP)1 for LTE) from
the MC to the SC (assuming SCs are available). Most
existing work so far have assumed that each BS or mobile
user has all others’ dynamics information whenever making
its resource allocation decisions [13]–[16]. Nevertheless,
this might not be realistic in HetNets due to the limited
capacity of the backhaul links and varied ownership of
network devices [17], [18]. Moreover, obtaining/estimating
all the channel gains on each of the resource blocks is highly
impractical, since it leads to an enormous amount of control
overheads. In order to find a desired trade-off between
the global network performance reached at the equilibrium
and the amount of signaling needed to make it work, we
investigate a strategy based on an automated dynamic offset
selection where only a partial CDI is assumed to be known
at the transmitter. We define the offset as the channel
quality indicator (CQI) which represents a measure of the
channel quality. This is a challenging network selection
problem, whose solution is critical for many applications
and use-cases in future wireless systems. Indeed, it has
been shown that aggressively offloading mobile users from
MC to SCs can lead to degradation of user-specific as
well as network wide performance. On the other hand, a
conservative approach may result in load disparity, which
not only leads to underutilization of resources but also
degrades the performance of multimedia applications [19].
1RSRP is a measure of the received signal strength of a cell at a mobile
user and it is measured based on the strength of certain reference signals
that cells broadcast.
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Clearly, in such cases any offloading strategy agnostic
to these conditions is undesirable, which emphasizes the
importance of more adaptive offloading/onloading strategies
[20]–[24].
C. Our Contributions
In LTE networks, user equipments (UEs) (referred to
hereafter and interchangeably, as (mobile) users or players)
associate typically with the cell with highest RSRP. Re-
cently, the introduction of enhanced inter cell interference
coordination (eICIC) standards allowed the received signal
strength based user association in LTE to be biased towards
low power nodes by a suitable margin. The details of how
much to bias the association in favor of low power nodes
is left unspecified.
Our main result within this paper is to propose an
alternative solution for the network operator to maximize
its revenue by adequately choosing the bias (which we
refer to as dynamic offset) about channel quality indicator
rather than increasing the throughput (which is costly and
energy inefficient). Technically, our approach not only aims
at improving the network equilibrium efficiency but has also
at least two nice features:
• It allows the network to guide users to a desired
equilibrium that optimizes its own utility if it chooses
the adequate dynamic offset to send,
• Only the individual user demand and a partial CDI of
the other users is needed at each transmitter.
Automated dynamic offset for network selection problem
was also considered in [25] and [24]. The major differences
between these previous works and this work are: In [25],
we studied the case of two users attempting to connect
to Internet, having the choice between 3G LTE and WiFi
networks, where the 3G LTE network throughput is assumed
to be constant and no access control was considered at the
network level. Then, in [24], we analyzed a Stackelberg
formulation of the network selection problem with an arbi-
trary number of competing users, but without counting for
the network load.
This paper considers load-aware network selection solu-
tions, in which partial asymmetric information is available.
Partial because the information available in making optimal
network selection decisions is incomplete, and asymmetric
because the information at the MC depends on the load,
whereas the information available at the SC depends on the
radio conditions. This contributes to the design of automated
dynamic offset which optimizes network’s global utility
while intelligence is split between the MC and mobile users.
We further provide a procedure on how to compute the dy-
namic offset for different scenarios. Interestingly, it turns out
that the complexity of the algorithm for finding the dynamic
offset of the Stackelberg model is polynomial in the number
of users. We also obtain explicit characterizations of the
dynamic offset at the equilibrium and the price of anarchy
(PoA)2 of such a system. In particular, it is noteworthy to
mention that when the network goal is orthogonal to users’
goal, this can lead the users to a misleading association
policy. The reason behind this is that the information given
to the user is misleading, since the utility of the user cannot
be directly inferred from the quality of his channel when
the MC goal is orthogonal to users’ goal.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a HetNet consisting of a single MC and a
set of partly overlaying SCs operating on non-overlapping
frequency bands, delivering an interference free spectrum
assignment. We also assume open access control mecha-
nism, i.e., all customers of the operator’s network have the
right to make use of any of the available SCs. Thus, each
user arriving in the system will decide individually to which
of the available systems it is best to connect according
to its radio condition, its demand and the statistical infor-
mation about other users. Their strategies are then based
on this (incomplete) information. The association problem
is then generalized to allow the MC to control the users’
behavior by broadcasting appropriate information, expected
to maximize its utility while individual users maximize
their own utilities. b
i
is the demand of user i. b
i
= 1
when there exists a demand and is equal to 0 otherwise.
a
i
is the action of user i defined by the user’s decision to
connect to a certain RAN. a
i
= 1 when the user chooses
the SC network, and a
i
= 0 when the user chooses the
MC. h
i
is the uplink channel gain between the SC and the





random variable with a Rayleigh distribution. This Rayleigh
fading assumption is not crucial to our work, but it makes
exposition easier. By the transformation theorem for single
random variable, it is well known that the effect of Rayleigh
fading on power attenuation is equivalent to considering
the channel gain h
i
as an exponentially distributed random
variable with mean  
i
[26]. We will see later how  
i
is
related to different parameters adopted throughout the paper.
We further consider a low time-varying network in which
the propagation channels maintain constant for a reasonable
time interval in order for the network to converge to a stable
solution.





). The network is fully characterized by the user
state. However, when distributing the JRRM decisions, this
complete information is not available to the users. The MC
broadcasts to UEs an aggregated information indicating a
measurement of the communication quality of the wireless
channel (excellent, fair, poor...). This can be done through
the CQI which can be a value (or values) representing a
measure of channel quality for a given channel. Typically,
a high value CQI is indicative of a channel with high quality
2The PoA is the ratio of the utility attained when a network planner
chooses policies to maximize social welfare versus the utility attained in




 2 the noise variance,
b
i
the demand of user i. b
i
= 1 when there exists a
demand, and 0 otherwise,
 
i





the uplink channel power gain between the SC and the





the dynamic offset parameter (or CQI threshold) of user
i set by the MC,
s
i
the channel state of user i. s
i










, which corresponds to





the action of user i. a
i
= 1 when the user chooses the
SC, and 0 when the user chooses MC,
P the policy profile matrix,
D the MC peak rate,
G the opportunistic scheduler gain,
v
min
the lower (minimal) throughput of the streaming service,
v
max
the upper (best) throughput of the streaming service.
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIOUS PARAMETERS.
and vice versa. More formally, assume that the knowledge











}, with  i – a fixed threshold,
and 1I
C
is the indicator function equal to 1 if condition
C is satisfied and to 0 otherwise. We will call  
i
the CQI
threshold of user i, referred to hereafter and interchangeably
as dynamic offset. Thus, a user only knows whether he
wants to transmit and whether the channel is in a good
condition (s
i
= 1) or in a bad condition (s
i
= 0) given the
CQI threshold. In addition, any player has the information









). These are given by ↵
i
– the






– the probability that the
demand b
i
= 1. Let us denote by P = [P1, . . . ,Pn]T the
(n⇥ 2) policy profile matrix, whose element Pi represents
the action vector taken by the mobile user i in low and high
channel states for i = {1, . . . , n}. The various parameters
used throughout the paper are listed in Table I.
In the next sections, we provide a thorough analysis of
the existence and characterization of the Bayes equilibria
for both non-cooperative and Stackelberg scenarios. We first
focus on the two-user case in order to gain insights into how
to design decision problem in mobile wireless environments.
Then, we generalize our approach to the multi-user case.
The first step before analyzing the Stackelberg Bayesian
decision scheme is to define the utilities of the users. These
are often related to throughput, whose variations are mainly
due to network load and radio conditions.
A. The Macro Cell Throughput
When performing network selection decisions, the mo-
bile can benefit from knowledge about real time network
conditions and quality parameters. In addition, the cellular
network congestion condition need to be considered. This
allows the UE to perform access decisions not only based on
the viability of the SC network, but also on the conditions
on the MC access to determine the need to move traffic to
SC and when such traffic can indeed be moved back to the
MC network.
Motivated by the fact that the exponential growth in
mobile traffic is primarily driven by streaming service, we
consider a real-time transport protocol (RTP) streaming
service which takes into account both the cellular network
congestion and the mobile user’s radio conditions. The UE’s
utility is expressed by the quality of his streaming flow,
which is in turn closely related to his throughput. Indeed,
a streaming call with a higher throughput will enable the
UE to stream the video at a higher bit rate and therefore
offering a better video quality. The goal of a streaming
user is thus to achieve the best throughput of between an
upper (best) v
max







). This throughput depends not only on the
peak throughput, but also on the evolution of the number of
calls in the system where the user decides to connect. Note
that a user that cannot be offered this minimal throughput
in neither of the available systems is blocked in order to
preserve the overall network performance. However, once
connected, we suppose that a call will not be dropped even
if its radio conditions degrade because of mobility.
Assuming fair scheduling among different users, the
throughput of a user connected to the MC when there are










where G is the opportunistic scheduler gain and D is the
MC peak rate (i.e., the throughput a user would obtain
if he were alone in the cell). Here, we assume that the
MC has sufficient resources to guarantee to every user the
throughput he requires depending on his demand and the
system load. Note that the admission control will ensure
that v   v
min
by blocking new arrivals. Without loss of
generality, we may assume also that DG   v
max
.
B. The Small Cell Throughput
The measurement of average throughput of a node in a SC
network is done by the time it takes to transfer the files be-
tween the SC and the mobile users. The throughput depends
on the bit rate at which the wireless mobile communicates
to its SC, which greatly depends on the attenuation level
at the receiver side due to his geographical position. This
can vary greatly depending on the link conditions. The SC














where  2 is the noise variance and p the user’s transmit
power. Notice that, in (2), we consider that there is no
resource partitioning (and thus no interference) between the
MC and the SC as they both operate on non-overlapping
frequency bands.
The utility we have considered in (2) is better suited
for lightly loaded SCs or for situations where each user
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is only given a tiny fraction of the SC resources regardless
of the load assuming that this fraction is small enough that
the SC can support all users [23]. Of course, this comes
at the expense of decreasing the spectral efficiency of the
network. However, we shall notice that there exists a plenty
of scenarios where such a situation is met, notably situations
with priority among users. For example, when resource
allocation rules correspond to those of primary users in
cognitive radio or spectrum pooling networks, in which
each user enjoys only a limited access to the spectrum. The
rationale behind this stems from the fact that primary users
maximizing their own spectral efficiency independently of
the others can result in suboptimal usage of the spectrum
[27].
Remark 1. The BS depends crucially on truthful reporting
of their channel states by the UEs. For example, in the
frequency-division duplex (FDD) system, the BS has no
direct information on the channel gains, but transmits
downlink pilots, and relies on the UEs’ reported values
of gains on these pilots for scheduling. A cooperative UE
will truthfully report this information to the BS. A non-
cooperative UE will however send a signal that is likely
to induce the scheduler to behave in a manner beneficial
to the UE. In our case and since we consider the uplink
scenario, users do not distribute anything except their























Knowing the information that a player has, there are four
possible policies of a player i with b
i
= 1 (we do not
consider state b
i











S M S M
where indices M and S stand for the MC (i.e., a
i
= 0) and
the SC (i.e., a
i
= 1) respectively. Notice that the top row
corresponds to s
i
= 0 while the bottom row corresponds
to s
i
= 1. In the sequel, we will refer to these four
policies shortly as SS, SM , MS and MM policies. Let
us not consider the policy SM , which is irrational, as the









. We then have
a game with partial CDI with two states and 3 actions for
each player in every state.
III. THE TWO-USER CASE
For the ease of comprehension, we will begin by consid-
ering the two-user case and then generalize the results to
the multi-user case later in Section IV.
A. Utilities








; if user i chooses M at state s,
C
i
(s); if user i chooses S at state s.
(4)
The functions Ci(s), describing the utility of player i



































































) above is the utility of player i using S when
channel gain is h
i














On the other hand, the utilities vi
k
of player i using the





























































The utilities for the last two cases reflect the fact that
some arrivals may be blocked by the admission control
when there is not enough resource for all the players - in





) willing to connect to the MC network
are chosen at random (with equal probabilities)3 and they
receive the service4. Note that the utilities defined above




















3More precisely, the quantities appearing in (7) and (8) can be interpreted
as follows: The term multiplied by v
max
is the probability that i is the
only player using MC, the term appearing before min{DG2 , vmax} and
v
max
2 is the probability that there are two players requesting connection
to MC. Then if DG2 < vmin, one player is chosen at random, so his
utility is v
max
with probability 12 and 0 with probability
1
2 . Otherwise
both players are admitted and their utility is min{DG2 , vmax}.
4In reality the ones chosen at random in our model would be those
whose request was considered first.
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B. The non-cooperative equilibrium
Game theory has accentuated the importance of random-
ized games or mixed games. However, such a game does not
find any significant role in most communication modems
or source coding codecs since equilibria where each user
randomly picks a decision at each time epoch cannot be
used effectively there, as they amount to perpetual handover
between networks.
Definition 1 (Bayes-Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile
Pi
BNE , 8i = 1, 2 corresponds to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(BNE) if, for all users, any unilateral switching to a different
strategy cannot improve user’s payoff at any state. Mathe-
matically, this can be expressed by the following inequality,



















where the " i" subscript on vector P stands for "except
user i".
Proposition 1. The game considered in the paper always
has a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Moreover
(a) (SS, SS) is an equilibrium iff Ci(0)   vi
SS
for i = 1, 2.
















(d) (MS,SS) is an equilibrium iff C1(1)   v1
SS
  C1(0)
and C2(0)   v2
MS
.
(e) (MS,MS) is an equilibrium iff Ci(1)   vi
MS
  Ci(0)
for i = 1, 2.





(0) and C2(1)  v2
MS
.
















(i) (MM,MM) is an equilibrium iff Ci(1)  vi
MM
for
i = 1, 2.
Proof: The statements (a)–(i) are direct consequences
of the definition of Bayes-Nash equilibrium and the form
of payoff matrices. Next, using inequalities (9,10), it is
straightforward to show that we always have at least one
of the conditions (a)–(i) satisfied.
The next proposition gives us some information on how
the Nash-Bayes equilibria depend on the chosen values of
the CQI thresholds  
i
.
Proposition 2. For any player i, if  
i
is the small enough,
player i does not use policy SS in equilibrium. If it is large
enough, player i does not use policy MM in equilibrium.




















If Ci(1) 6= v
max
for i = 1, 2, then for all the values of
the parameters of the model one of the three possibilities is
true:
(a) For  1 and  2 small enough, both players use policy
MM in equilibrium,
(b) For  1 and  2 large enough, both players use policy
SS in equilibrium,
(c) For  
i
small enough, i uses policy MM in equilib-
rium, while for  
j
large enough j uses policy SS in
equilibrium.
Proof: Note that5:
1) when  
i
! 0, Ci(0)( 
i









for i = 1, 2;
2) when  
i
! 1, Ci(0)( 
i










Thus for  
i






Proposition 1 implies that player i does not use policy SS in
equilibrium. Analogously for  
i






, and so player i does not use MM in equilibrium then.
Let us assume now that both  1 and  2 are either
very small or very large and that in both situations the










)   Ci(0)( 
i
)
for i = 1, 2 in both situations ( 
i
s small or large). Now
taking into account properties 1) and 2) described above,
we can pass to the limit as  
i





  0 for i = 1, 2. (12)
Analogously, passing to the limit as  
i




  C1(1) for i = 1, 2. (13)




We prove similarly that neither of the situations enumer-
ated below is possible: one of the profiles (MS,MM) or
(MM,MS) is an equilibrium for  
i
s approaching 0 and
(MS,MS) is an equilibrium for  
i
s approaching infinity,
or (MS,MS) is an equilibrium for  
i
! 0 and (MS,SS)
or (SS,MS) is an equilibrium for  
i
! 1.
The result of this proposition can be interpreted in the
following manner: for higher values of the CQI thresholds
 
i
the players prefer to use the SC rather than the MC
and conversely, for low  
i
s they prefer to use the MC.
Interestingly, Proposition 2 also suggests that, rather than
increasing the offered throughput v, the operator could
control the equilibrium of its wireless users to maximize its
own revenue by broadcasting appropriate CQI thresholds.
This can lead the network to minimize its overall cost
and users to a misleading association problem. Next, we
5In what is written below we use the convention that Ci(s)( 
i
) means







the value of vi
MS





extend the analysis of the above mentioned problem using
hierarchical approach.
C. The hierarchical equilibrium
In this section, we propose a methodology that transforms
the above non-cooperative game into a Stackelberg game.
Concretely, the MC network may guide users to an equilib-
rium that optimizes its own utility U
MC
if it chooses the
adequate information to send. We first study the policy that
maximizes the utility of the network, which is defined as
the expected throughput of the MC network (we need to
define it using two steps):
U
MC
















where q1 and q2 are the probabilities that player 1, respec-
tively player 2, uses the MC. Consequently
U
MC















Nevertheless, as it is not realistic to consider that the
users will seek the global optimum, we show how to
find the policy that corresponds to the Bayes-Stackelberg
equilibrium where the MC tries to maximize U
MC
just by
choosing the CQI thresholds, knowing that users will try to
maximize their individual utility.
Definition 2 (Bayes-Stackelberg equilibrium). By de-
noting ( 1BSE , 2BSE) the strategy profile of the MC










(PBNE( 1, 2), 1, 2),
(14)
where PBNE( 1, 2) is any Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the
game of the previous section with CQI thresholds equal to
 1,  2.
We next exemplify our general analysis by investigating
the possibility of considering three scenarios for the choice
of  1 and  2:
1) Centralized model – the MC chooses both  
i
s and
the policies for the players, aiming to maximize U
MC
.










2) Stackelberg model – there are two stages: at the first
one the MC chooses both  
i
s given the information




) aiming to maximize
the throughput of the MC network at the second stage,
when players play the game from the last section.
The proposed approach can be seen as intermediate
scheme between the centralized model and the fully
non-cooperative model,
3) Fully non-cooperative model – the game has two
stages: at the first one, players choose their  
i
s given





) aiming to maximize their expected throughput
at the second stage; at the second stage they choose




) as in the model
of the last section. Formally, a fully non-cooperative






















) being any Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium in the game of the previous section.
Remark 2. The name fully non-cooperative suggests a
different model, without two stages, where the decision
both about the CQI thresholds and about players’ policies
is made by the users at the same time. As it will be
shown in Proposition 4, the two models are equivalent.
The two-step procedure that we propose only makes a clear
distinction between stage one when no communication is
needed, because all the data necessary to compute the  
i
is
available to all the players and the MC, and stage two when
the information about channel quality has to be reported to
the players to assign them to MC or to SC. Thus, as in all the
other scenarios that we provide, the amount of information
that has to be transmitted during the game is very limited.
Below, we analyze the behavior of the MC and the players
at the equilibria of each of these models.
Proposition 3.
1) In the centralized model, the MC chooses any  1 and
 2, and MM policy for both users.
2) In the Stackelberg model, the MC does the following
steps:
a) Computes Ci(1) for i = 1, 2. If C1(1)  v1
MM
and C2(1)  v2
MM
, then it chooses any
 1 <  
⇤⇤







1 ) = v
1
MM
and C2(1)( ⇤⇤2 ) = v2
MM
and
then users both play MM in the second stage.




( 1(1   e  1 1), 2) subject
to v1
MS








( 1, 2(1   e  2 2))






( 1)   C2(1);
b3: maximize U
MC
( 1(1  e  1 1), 2(1  e  2 2))
subject to C1(1)( 1)   v1
MS
( 2)   C1(0)( 1),
C
2
(1)( 2)   v2
MS
( 1)   C2(0)( 2).
It chooses the biggest of the three value functions
V
b
(if some of these problems has no solutions we
assume the value of its value function is 0) and  1,
 2 solving this problem is what it plays at the first
6If some problem does not depend on  
i




stage of the game. At the second stage players choose
policies (MS,MM), (MM,MS) and (MS,MS) if
the solution of problem b1, b2 and b3 (respectively)
was chosen by the MC.
3) In the fully non-cooperative model, the players in
















and then both use a MS policy.
For the clarity of the exposition, proofs are given in the
Appendix. What we see in this proposition is that when the
MC can decide on the behavior of the users, it forces them
to use the MC. In other cases (when users can decide on
their behavior, but are given only partial information), the
users’ interest is to choose the CQI thresholds somewhere in
the middle of the channel gain range. On the other hand, the
MC has an incentive to choose CQI thresholds either very
low (first case in the Stackelberg scenario) or very high (the
second case). Both these choices give little information for
the user about actual channel condition, which is what he
wants to avoid. It is interesting and somewhat surprising that
the optimal policy of the MC in the Stackelberg game can be
both giving high or low values of CQI thresholds. This can
however be explained when we understand the meaning of
these two situations – very low value of the threshold means
that no information about the channel state is given. In this
case, when both users connect to the MC, this corresponds
to the choice of the MC. Now, if in the "no information"
case players choose the SC network, then the MC tries to
divide the range of h
i
into a small (in terms of probability)
part when the players use the SC and, a large one when they
use the MC. This is done by giving the highest possible CQI
threshold below which the players would have an incentive
to use rather the MC than the SC. This explains why the
MC has an incentive to choose CQI thresholds very high in
this case.
In the next proposition, we show that the strategies
chosen by the players in the fully non-cooperative scenario
of Proposition 3 are also equilibria in two other non-
cooperative models, differing from the one considered above
by the time the decisions are made by the players or the
amount of information available to them.
Proposition 4. Consider two alternative non-cooperative
models:
(M1) The game has one stage, at which the players choose
both CQI thresholds and policies they apply, aiming
to maximize their own throughput. They base their






(M2) The game has one stage, at which the players choose
whether they want to connect to MC or SC, aiming
to maximize their own throughput. Each player knows




) of the opponent and exact





If  ⇤1 and  ⇤2 are CQI thresholds chosen in part 3) of
Proposition 3, then  ⇤1- and  ⇤2-threshold policies (that
is - MS policies with  ⇤
i
CQI thresholds) are also in
equilibrium in models (M1) and (M2).
The final result of this section is given without proof,
which is straightforward. In that result, we give the method
to compute the PoA for our model. Remind that the PoA
measures how good the system performance is when users
play selfishly and reach the NE instead of playing to achieve
the social optimum obtained in the centralized model with
utility U
MC
( 1, 2). Thus the PoA when players use strat-







(q(P1, 1), q(P2, 2))
.
Thus, Proposition 3 implies that
Corollary 1. The PoA in the Stackelberg model equals 1
whenever Ci(1)  vi
MM













is the value of the objective function computed in
Proposition 3.







( 1(1  e  1 ⇤1 ), 2(1  e  2 ⇤2 )) ,
where  ⇤1 and  ⇤2 satisfy (15).
The above corollary is just a rewriting of the Proposition
3 using different language.
IV. THE MULTI-USER CASE
Now, let us consider the case where instead of two we
have n users choosing to connect either to the SC or to
the MC network. Again we assume that the information
about the channel quality that user i possesses is limited




) of each of











(but not about exact value of h
i
). We make two additional
assumptions about the model considered in this section. The







defining it, are the same for each of the players





. Both of them aim at simplifying the
notation used in our considerations. On the other hand, we
believe that some counterparts of all our results are true also
without these assumptions, so they can be made without
serious limitation of generality.
A. Utilities
Again we assume that each of the players uses one of the
three policies SS,MS,MM , where first letter stands for a
player’s action when his channel is bad, and the second
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one when his channel is good. As it is troublesome to write
down the policies for each of n players, we will make use
of the fact that the game is symmetric, writing instead of







denoting the number of players applying policy MM
and k
MS
– of players applying MS. Of course the number




, so we will omit






vK i ; if user i chooses M at state s,
C(s); if user i chooses S at state s
(16)
where C(s) is defined as Ci(s) for two-user case, with the
superscript omitted because the model is symmetric, while
the values vK i , describing the utility of player i using the
MC when his opponents use policies described by K, are























·e  (q w) (1  e   )w min{k⇤,r+w+1}
r+w+1
·min{ DGmin{k⇤,r+w+1} , vmax}
(17)




} is the biggest number
of users that can be admitted to MC without decreasing
their throughputs below v
min
(remember that, as in the two-
player case, the utility defined above is the expected value of
user’s throughput, already taking into account the admission
control).
B. The equilibria
Below, we give a generalization of Proposition 1 for the
n-user case.
Proposition 5. The symmetric n-user game considered in
the paper always has a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium of one of seven types:
(a) When v[k 1,l]   C(1)   v[k,l 1]   C(0)   v[k,l],
then any profile where k players use policy MM , l
players use policy MS, and all the others play SS is
an equilibrium.
(b) When v[k 1,0]   C(1)   C(0)   v[k,0] then any profile
where k players apply policy MM and the remaining
n  k players use policy SS is an equilibrium.
(c) When v[k 1,n k]   C(1)   v[k,n k 1]   C(0) then
any profile where k players apply policy MM and
the remaining n   k players use policy MS is an
equilibrium.
(d) When v[n 1,0]   C(1) then the profile where all the
players use policy MM is an equilibrium.
(e) When C(1)   v[0,k 1]   C(0)   v[0,k], then any profile
where k players use policy MS and all the others play
SS is an equilibrium.
7Notation K i used below denotes policy statistics defined as in the
two-user case but without policy of user i.
8Of S as this is a generalization of the formulas for vi
k
given in Section







⌘ v[0,0] when n = 2 and players are symmetric.
(f) When C(1)   v[0,n 1]   C(0) then the profile where
all the players use policy MS is an equilibrium.
(g) When C(0)   v[0,0] then the profile where all the
players use policy SS is an equilibrium.
We give a corollary to this proposition. It gives a kind
of consistency property for equilibria in games for different
values of n.
Corollary 2.
(a) Suppose that a profile where at least one player uses
policy SS and the number of players using policies
MM and MS is k, is an equilibrium in n-user sym-
metric game. Then it is also an equilibrium in any m-
user game defined with the same parameters  ,  and
 and m   k.
(b) Moreover for any fixed parameters  ,  and  there
exists an m such that for any n > m at least n  
m players use policy SS in any equilibrium in n-user
game.
Proof: Note that v[k,l] does not depend on the number
of players in the game n, only on the number of those who
use one of the policies MS or MM . Just this implies part
(a). Part (b) is due to the fact that v[k,l] ! 0 as either
k ! 1 or l ! 1.
The next proposition generalizes the results for hierarchi-
cal model included in Proposition 3 for n-user symmetric
games. We consider all the above scenarios, yet in scenario
3) we only show that the equilibrium is symmetric, but
assume that players may act asymmetrically in general. To
do so we look for symmetric equilibria in the model (which
exist, but we believe are not the only ones possible there,
even though the model itself is symmetric). The rationale
behind this simplification is twofold: firstly – considering
asymmetric equilibria would cause various problems with
notation; secondly and most important – we believe that
asymmetric equilibria, where users may have different func-
tional form of their strategies, are harder to justify, as they
would require prior coordination among the devices to agree
on which equilibrium is played.
The MC utility, defined as before, as the expected
throughput of the MC network, can be now written as:
U
MC





























1) In the centralized model, the MC chooses any value of
 and MM policy for all the users.
2) In the Stackelberg model, the MC computes C(1) (see
(11)) and finds k⇤⇤ such that
v[k⇤⇤ 1,0] > C(1)   v[k⇤⇤,0]. (19)
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If such a k⇤⇤ does not exist, it sets k⇤⇤ = 0. Next:
(a) If n  k⇤⇤ then at the equilibrium the MC chooses
any  such that v[n 1,0]   C(1)( ), and all the
players use policy MM .
(b) If n > k⇤⇤ then:
b1) for any k such that k⇤⇤  k  n and any
0  l  k⇤⇤ the MC does the following steps: it
finds  such that
C(1)( ) = v[l 1,k l]( ). (20)
If such a  does not exist or C(0)( ) <
v[l,k l]( ), it puts P (k, l) = 0. Otherwise it finds
 such that
C(0)( ) = v[l,k l 1]( ) (21)
If such a  does not exist, it puts  = 1.
Finally, if P (k, l) has not been defined yet, it takes
 (k, l) = min{ , } and computes
P (k, l) = U
MC
([l, k   l], (k, l)).





value of P (k, l) (which equals the MC utility at





first stage and any profile of policies where l
max





will then be an equilibrium.





) = v[0,n 1]( 
⇤
), (22)
and then all use MS policy at the second stage of the
game.
In order to compare the network utility under different
modes, we give two corollaries to this proposition.











([n, 0], ) is the maximum value of the MC’s
utility obtained in scenario 1) of Proposition 6), which is
independent of  . Moreover:
1) In the Stackelberg model it is either equal to 1 when








with k⇤⇤ and P (k, l) defined as in Proposition 6.











with  ⇤ defined as in Proposition 6.
The corollary is again just a rewriting of the results from
Proposition 6 with the stress made on network utilities rather
than strategies of the players. It shows that exactly the same
procedure, used to find the equilibrium policies, can be
applied to evaluate the performance of the network.
V. THE NON-COOPERATIVE FULL CSI MODEL
In this section, we consider a model where every player
has full information about the quality of channels and
amount of data to be transmitted by each of the players. It
means that the players use exact information about their own
CSI in their decisions, not only the indication whether it is
good or bad, and also that they use exact information about
that of the others, not limited to their distributions. Notice
that the non-cooperative full CSI scheme is not realistic as
it is not feasible to consider that the network operator will
divulge users’ CSI to other users. This will thus serve as
as a reference model in our numerical analyses in order
to demonstrate how much gain may be exploited through
considering such a non-cooperative full CSI solution with
respect to the other schemes we considered which uses
partial CDI.
Suppose9 that the number of transmitting players is n.
Further, we assume that each of the players knows exact
values of all the channel power gains h
j
. This means that
strategies P
i
in this game will map any power gain profile
(h1, . . . , hn) into the set {M,S}.
A. Utilities
Consequently, the utility of a player will depend on
his strategy P
i
and on number k i of those except him







vk i ; if user i chooses M,
c(h
i
); if user i chooses S (23)
with c(h
i
) defined as ci(h
i
) for two-user case, with the
superscript omitted because the model is symmetric, and
the values vk i , describing the utility of player i using M




min{k⇤, k + 1}
k + 1
min{ DG
min{k⇤, k + 1} , vmax} (24)






Below, we show how to find equilibria in the non-
cooperative full CSI model described above. To formulate
our main result, we will need some additional notation. Let




}|, that is, ⇡(i) = l means that h
i
is the l-th smallest channel gain. The following result will
hold for our n-player non-cooperative full CSI game.
9The use of n is a little abuse of notation, because here we do not
assume that users transmit only with a given probability, like in all the
other schemes we considered.
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Proposition 7. The n-user non-cooperative full CSI game
considered in the paper always has a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, any10 equilibrium can be identified








for i and j such that ⇡(i) = bk and ⇡(j) = bk + 1 (with the




) for any i, then we
take bk = n, while when v1 < c(hi) for any i, then we take
b
k = 0), then each player j such that ⇡(j)  bk plays M in
equilibrium, while each player j such that ⇡(j) > bk plays
S in the equilibrium.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
One of the major goals of the proposed approach is to
delegate the access selection decisions to the devices, while
providing the network with more control over SC access
selections. The main idea behind this is that the device is
in the unique position to make the best final determination
of when traffic can be transported over SC (e.g., based on
real-time radio conditions, type of pending traffic, device
conditions such as mobility and battery status, etc.). This
led us to propose a network-assisted approach where both
the device and the network are involved in choosing the best
network selection decisions. From an implementation point
of view, the proposed hierarchical scheme requires little
communication between players. The steps of the proposed
approach (described in Fig. 2) are as follows: The SC
collects the channel gain estimates h
i
received from UEs
within its coverage. Then, with the goal of reducing the
overhead backhaul traffic, the MC sends to the SC the CQI
threshold  computed at the previous scheduling stage, and
the SC, in turn, sends back a one-bit indication of the quality
of the channel (either in bad or good state) to the MC. Next,
the MC distributes the updated value of  computed using
algorithm from Prop. 5 or Prop. 6, along wih the estimate(s)
of ↵ computed using Eq. (3). Based on that, UEs select their
equilibrium strategies, compute their expected utilities and
return their network preference lists to the MC. Finally, the
MC decides to which cell it better to attach each UE (either
MC or SC), and each network computes its utility.
Notice that the algorithm for computing the  is run
at the macro BS. However, this is not a restriction of
the proposed approach, as it can also be run at the user
side and not transmitted. Obviously, these are not trivial
computations, it is thus better to run them once at the macro
BS and send the  to all the users.
The next proposition points out an important feature of
the algorithm for finding the solution to the Stackelberg
game.
Proposition 8. The complexity of the algorithm for finding
the equilibrium of the Stackelberg model, described in part
2) of Proposition 6 is O(n4) (where n is the number of
users).
10If each channel gain is different, then the equilibrium will be unique.
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram showing the set of parameters/values communi-
cated among MC/SC and UE, and the set of steps implemented at MC/SC
and UE.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider a scenario of an operator providing sub-
scribers with a streaming service available through a large
MC coexisting with a SC. users require a minimal through-
put of 350 Kbps and can profit from throughputs up to 2.8





= 2.8 Mbps). As mentioned before, users
are characterized by the distribution of their uplink channel
and the distribution of their demand. In order to validate
our theoretical findings, we obtain users’ actions at the
equilibrium defined by users’ decisions to connect to the
SC or the MC at low and high channel state. In particular,
we present extensive results for the hierarchical (Stackel-
berg) equilibrium, non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium and
compare them with the centralized (optimal) strategy. To
do so, we define a set of n 2 {2, . . . , 50} competing
users with Rayleigh fading characterized by parameter  ,
assumed to be symmetric for the multi-user case. For the
following set of simulations, we take   = 8 dB with a line of
sight channel gain of 30 dB. Each user thus experiences an
average channel gain at 26% of the maximum transmission
channel gain. We also set the demand load   = 0.5 for
every user, and the channel state ↵ derives from   and  
as in Eq. (3). 1000 scenarios are simulated to remove the
random effects from Rayleigh fading. To show the influence
of user’s CQI threshold  on the different equilibrium
strategies, we compute the users’ best responses for different
values of the threshold  . It is then possible to compute
the non-cooperative Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies and
the related users’ utilities obtained at the equilibrium. For
the hierarchical Stackelberg equilibrium, given the action of
the MC, i.e., the CQI threshold  , we compute the best-
response function of the users defined as the action that
maximizes users’ utilities given the action of the MC. The
network utility is defined as the average throughput obtained
by a user selecting the MC. Finally, under the formerly
defined policy statistics K = {k, l}, the ratio number of
users connected to system a (with a = M for the MC and
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a = S for the SC), L(a), can be expressed as follows:
L(M) = (k + l↵)/n (25)
L(S) = (n  k   l↵)/n (26)
A. Performances as a function of the CQI threshold  
In Figures 3 and 4, we plot the ratio number of users
connected per system according to the strategies at the
equilibrium as a function of the normalized CQI threshold
 . First, as claimed by Prop. 6 1), we find that, for the
centralized policy, all users choose policy MM for any
value of  fixed by the MC. Second, in accordance to the
result of Prop. 6, the ratio numbers of users connected to the
MC and the SC networks match the announced equilibrium
policies for some specific values of the CQI threshold. In
particular, we find that, as we increase the value of  , users
have more incentive to choose strategy S at the equilibrium.
Asymptotically, when  grows large, users avoid choosing
strategy M at equilibrium, since the channel will be claimed
to be always bad. Next, for the values of   0.5 when
n = 8 and   0.45 when n = 40, all the players select M
below  . Above these values some players start using SS
policy. Similarly, for    0.33 when n = 8 and    0.3
when n = 40, all the players select S above  , while below
these values some select MM policy.
Further, in the case of n < k⇤⇤ in Figure 3, we observe
that for   0.05, all the players use M . As a consequence,
the value of  = 0.05 is chosen in hierarchical equilibrium,
as it guarantees the maximal use of the MC network. On
the other hand, the CQI threshold at the non-cooperative
equilibrium is reached for  ⇤ = 0.5, where only 20% of
the players use MC network. It clearly suggests a better
efficiency of the Stackelberg formulation in this case.
In the case of n > k⇤⇤ presented in Figure 4, the
percentage of users associated with the MC network further
decreases to 16% for  ⇤ = 0.3. In the Stackelberg case, the
 increases to 0.45, with 28% of the players choosing M .
In both cases, all the players use MS policy, but higher
 implies that the use of strategy M is established more
often. Lack of players using MM policy in the Stackelberg
equilibrium is in accordance with Prop. 6 2)–(b), and rather
intuitive, as the MC becomes saturated when too many
players want to select it.
B. Performances as a function of the number of users n.
1) CQI threshold: In Figure 5, we compare the values
of the CQI thresholds at the non-cooperative equilibrium
 










) is for n  k⇤⇤ very small, as this guarantees
the connection of all the users to the MC network both
above and below the CQI threshold, while for n > k⇤⇤ it
rapidly increases to minimize the probability of connecting
to the SC network when users start applying MS policy at
the equilibrium. Further, we see that  at the Stackelberg
equilibrium decreases with the number of entering users.
This is because the individual throughput of the users
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Fig. 3. Ratio number of users connected per system at the equilibrium as
a function of  for n = 8.






























Users’ best response S





Fig. 4. Ratio number of users connected per system at the equilibrium as
a function of  for n = 40.
























Non−cooperative   
Hierarchical    
Fig. 5. CQI threshold at the equilibrium as function of increasing number
of competing users n.
connected to the MC decreases as n grows (see Eq. (1)),
while there is no such effect for the SC network (see Eq.
(2)). Thus users should be more attracted by the SC network,




) above which users
connect to the SC network. Even when v
min
is achieved,
the throughput for a user connected to the MC decreases,
because we measure it as the expected value, and this en-
compasses the situation when a user prefers to connect to the
MC even though he may end up not connected to it because
the MC is already saturated. Nevertheless, the probability
that the user chooses to connect to the MC remain big
enough for him to make it more attractive than the SC
network when h
i
is small. The CQI threshold at the non-
cooperative equilibrium  ⇤ follows the same decreasing





be noted though, that they become closer as n increases.
2) Users’ utilities: Figure 6 depicts users’ utilities for
increasing number of users. As expected, we first observe
that the hierarchical and the non-cooperative models give
the same outcome. In fact, the user’s utility is calculated
upon the estimates of the channel state of the user itself
and other users based on the MC indications of  at the
equilibrium. In the hierarchical case, the equilibrium may
not exist, in which case any value of  can be advertised
13
























Fig. 6. Average users’ utilities for increasing number of competing users.































Fig. 7. The price of anarchy for increasing number of competing users n.
by the MC which results in the same outcome as for the
non-cooperative case. Now, looking at the full CSI model,
we remark that with a greater number of users, the users’
utilities crucially decrease. This is justified by the fact that,
when n grows large, the MC becomes more saturated and
users move over to the SC. As each new user means more
saturation of the MC, users with worse channel conditions
on the SC become interested in using the SC anyway
which results in decreasing the users’ utilities for the full
CSI model. This contrasts with the situation when users
compete for the equilibrium strategies they estimate (i.e., the
hierarchical and the non-cooperative models) which show an
increasing utility as the number of user grows.
3) Network utility: Let us now analyse the performance
of the proposed approach on the network throughput at the
equilibrium. To do so, we plot in Figure 7 the PoA for the
different schemes studied. We observe several interesting
phenomena here. First of all, for the full CSI model,
increasing the numbers of users results both in a decrease
in average throughput on both networks and in the overall
use of the MC, which implies a higher PoA. Second, the
PoA of the non-cooperative model is a decreasing function
of the number of users. This result may seem surprising at
first glance, as usually a bigger number of players means
more anarchy. However, if we look at the objective function
of the MC in Eq. (8), which is the expected throughput of
the MC, we clearly see that a bigger number of players
is disadvantageous for the MC network which may get
congested (since the probability that any of the players
connected to the MC is active increases) and favorable for
the SC which yet cannot. One important consequence here is
that any mechanism aiming at stimulating the use of the MC
network only through a small amount of proper signaling,
should concentrate on doing it for smaller number of users.
Finally, as we can see in Figure 7, the proposed hierarchical
mechanism keeps the PoA almost equal to 1 even for a
low number of users, and remains bounded above by the
non-cooperative model in that case anyway. This suggests
that introducing hierarchy in decision making between the
different components of the network results in a better
utilization of network and radio resources with respect to
conventional centralized policies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our main goal within this paper is to design a dynamic
offset which enables operators to steer traffic in order to
provide a better user experience and enable the operator to
move traffic from the cellular network. To do so, we have
proposed a Bayesian hierarchical load-aware association
method where partial asymmetric information from the
MC and the SC are available in making optimal network
selection decisions. The users’ network selection decision
is guided by CQI messages conveyed to the mobile users
by the MC. Our main result is that we have shown that,
in order to maximize its revenue, the network operator –
rather than increasing the throughput (which is costly and
energy inefficient) – can drive the users to the MC network
by a proper choice of information to transmit. We notably
propose an algorithm for finding the dynamic offset for
the Stackelberg model whose complexity is polynomial in
the number of users. It turns out that the channel quality
indicator the operator should choose is either very small
or very large in comparison to the one maximizing the
global throughput of both systems. We have also observed
that the dynamic offset  at the Stackelberg equilibrium is
decreasing with the number of active users n. This is to
say that when n grows, users can connect more often to
the SC network without wasting the MC resources, which
results in a smaller  above which users connect to SC.
One important consequence is that any mechanism aiming at
stimulating the use of the MC network only through a small
amount of proper signaling, should concentrate on doing it
for smaller number of users. Furthermore, we have observed
that the PoA of the proposed hierarchical mechanism is
almost equal to 1 even for a low number of users, and
remains bounded above by the non-cooperative model as
the number of users grows. Achieving these results offers
hope that such a smart mechanism can be designed around
SC integration in HetNets and can be implemented using
the notion of Cell Selection Bias (CSB) proposed by LTE
standards.
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